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Selim Karlitekin (SK): I want to start with your book, Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt. There
you talk about a shift from the classical model of an empire that is highly attentive to the
local to a modern bureaucratic state. The transition is a well-known one, but the way you
tackle it is definitely not. Could you talk about this reconfiguration of the “political rule over
peoples and environments?” Why is this important?
Alan Mikhail (AM): Yes, I was certainly interested in narrating, roughly speaking, the transition from an early
modern political configuration to one that is something else, a transition, as you say, that has been narrated in many
different ways before. What we call that something else – capitalism, modernity or enlightenment – is as vexing a
topic in Ottoman and Middle Eastern history as it is in other historiographies. In the Middle East and elsewhere, it is
pretty striking that this transition is almost always placed in the period between 1750 and 1850. So, yes, like many
others, I was interested in this supposedly transitional moment, but I was not completely satisfied with the
explanations on offer. They were largely political ones in the most basic sense: stories of European colonialism
and/or various reform efforts in the empire, whether the Tanzimat or Mehmet ‘Ali’s projects of state in Egypt, the place
that concerned me most because it was the most lucrative as well as one of most important provinces of the empire .
There were also longer stories of endogenous change about more structural processes that were taking place in
Egypt in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but these as well still revolved around the same set of issues —
capitalism, modernity, literacy, class relations, modernization, and the rise of the nation state. As a student of Middle
Eastern and Ottoman history, I of course was (and still am) interested in these kinds of questions. I wanted with my
work to speak to the literature on these questions—questions again that the historiography of nearly all regions of the
globe deal with in one way or another in the very same period. I wanted though to tackle this period of transition in a
different way. So that’s a piece of it.
A major breakthrough for me came, not surprisingly, from the sources themselves. It
was clear to me from reading the archival and published sources that the control and
harnessing of natural resources was an important aspect of political rule in the
Ottoman Empire. That was true in Anatolia, in parts of the Balkans, and in the Arab
World. When I read courts records from Egypt, one of the main sources for Ottoman
historians, I found endless amounts about water and water supply, grain, rural labor
relations, and domestic animals, topics I became more and more interested in later
on. These topics — things agrarian, environmental, ecological — were clearly
economic and political. At first I found it curious that the sources we as a field have
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been using for decades spent so much time on topics that didn’t seem to have a
major place in the historiography I had grown up on. A disconnect. Something all over
our sources, something clearly important to the time and place I was studying,
seemed to be missing from the story. Ultimately I wanted to bring those two things
together—older stories about political and economic transformation and the
ecological perspective that I found right there in the archives.
I was helped in doing this by reading about how these transitions from early modernity to that something else mapped
onto other sorts of transitions. One of the most interesting for me was an energy transformation. That is, the history of
how, when, and why societies largely built around a solar energy regime transitioned to fossil fuels. Strikingly again,
we are telling histories of the period between 1750 and 1850. The historian Jack A. Goldstone in an article from 1998
suggested that instead of referring to “early modernity” we should think of the period from 1500 to 1800 as being
characterized by the presence of “advanced organic societies” around the globe. One of the most salient features of
the period, he and others argue, was that energy supplies, transport, food, and so on were based on an organic solar
energy regime. This regime changed around the turn of nineteenth century in different places for different reasons.
‘King Coal’ took control. This very different sort of transition had been dealt with by environmental historians, yet the
story had very little impact in Middle Eastern history. This is all the more striking given the enormous importance of
oil in the twentieth-century history of the Middle East. So all of this was swimming in my head in the mid-2000s and
influenced the way I thought about Egypt at the turn of the nineteenth century.
This environmental and economic history literature about energy and other things helped me to plot a trajectory
through the sources I was reading. One of the most striking things one notices in reading through the records of
public works in Ottoman Egypt is how their scale changed dramatically and, as it turned out for thousands,
traumatically at the turn of the nineteenth century. By the early nineteenth century, we have enormous public works
projects unimaginable only decades before. So again a very different set of environmental and political circumstances
than what maintained in the eighteenth century. In my book Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt, I focus on the
construction of one of these grand public works projects—the Mahmudiyya Canal in the late 1810s. Part of that
project was about increasing the independent sovereignty of Egypt against the Ottoman Empire. It was also about
expanding the possibilities for trade in Alexandria by providing the city with copious and reliable supplies of water.
The project also took aim at fighting the salinity of the western Nile Delta, at building seawalls to protect the canal,
and at manipulating its current and siltation properties. I don’t think you can separate out which of these efforts and
processes were strictly political and which were strictly environmental. It’s not clear where the border is — if there’s
one at all. The political and the environmental were and are the same.
The story of the intertwined relationships between politics and the environment—in
Egypt and elsewhere—is not a new one of course. Herodotus saw it. Wittfogel did
too. Nasser understood it as well. Environmental historians, science studies people,
geographers, and others have all been interested in these things for a very long time
indeed. For all these varied thinkers, the point is clear. Trying to separate
environmental processes and political projects assumes a false dichotomy.
So perhaps to answer your question more directly, I wanted to bring some of these
insights and ideas into Ottoman history. That’s the effort of the book.
SK: The Ottoman state and its intellectuals think of nature in the
nineteenth century, roughly, as an obstacle in the way of progress,
terakki. Marx in the Gründrisse talks about the transformation of limits
into barriers as a central motive in the history of capitalism. What
you term “an Ottoman imperial system of resource allocation,” more
or less a state of equilibrium at the turn of nineteenth century,
becomes a barrier to the development of Egypt. Historians often repeat this gesture—they
think in terms of barriers and backwardness. How do you think your book contributes to the
historiography of capitalism in Middle East?
It’s simply the
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AM: There’s a lot in your question. On the issue of barriers, there is indeed quite a strong strain of this sort of work in
Middle East Studies. Some of it is in the modernization vein: “if only we had that technology, that dam, that industry.”
There is a belief in the power of technology and expertise to overcome natural limits—the limits of donkey and camel
transport or the unreliable ups and downs of a river system. Part of the project of Nature and Empire and other work
is to critique this idea that if we just have the right technology we can overcome any barrier. This obviously taps into a
very old tension in the history of political thought—are there limits to resources that require management, allocation,
and sharing, or are they limitless? Is there a fixed amount of wealth in the world, or is it potentially ever-expanding? Is
infinite growth possible? Of course for most capitalists you can always have more and more. I don’t think this is right.
The technological version of this is that the right kind of technology will always get us out of our jams: “No need to
curb carbon emissions; we’ll find a way to geo-engineer our way out of the climate crisis,” for example. This way of
thinking is almost always wrong. First, there are the unintended consequences. All technologies thought to be
panaceas produce their own problems—the Aswan dam is a textbook case in this regard. Second, these technologies
almost always reproduce existing social tensions or disparities. Thus, they only reinforce the problems they were—at
least, ostensibly—meant to solve.
Technology can also produce certain path dependencies that only become clear later.
In other words, there are certain ways in which the very choices made about
technology come to limit society. An example is the highway system in the United
States. The thousands of miles of asphalt, the labor that went into clearing and
leveling the ground, the enormous amount of material the infrastructure consumed,
and so on. It’s really hard to imagine changing this system in any sort of real way.
Infrastructure only allows for certain possibilities of movement, action, politics, and
thought. This is what the Chinese environmental historian Mark Elvin calls
“technological lock-in”—societies set their infrastructure (in all the possible meanings
of that word) in concrete and thereby shape their political futures. This is of course a
way of getting us back to the artificiality of the nature-culture divide that Latour and
many others question and that was raised before in the realm of the connections
between politics and ecology. There is no nature box and no politics box. Public
works and environmental infrastructure have a role in creating political and economic
outcomes  and vice versa. This is not environmental determinism. It’s simply the
recognition of the role of environmental factors—like economic, social, and cultural
factors—in the shaping of history. The goal is to try to figure out the specifics of that
relationship between environment and society—ecology and capital—in different
times and places. There are many superlatively good examples of this work—Timothy
Mitchell’s on fossil fuels or Richard White’s on railroads, for instance.
SK: As an environmental historian, I wonder if you could talk about
how interdisciplinarity works for you. In Middle East Studies, there seems to be a certain
resistance to such things as the field is heavily charged with politics. Studies of Ottoman
infrastructure, for example, such as they exist, are often about testing whether or not these
structures signify modernity. This work doesn’t really think deeply about the objects
themselves.
We all of course talk about interdisciplinarity a lot – less than we used to I think – but
to actually do it is a little more difficult. It means talking to people who are not, in my
case, historians and certainly not Middle East historians. This is easier said than
done in a meaningful way. But if we want to work on certain topics, in other words, if
we take certain topics on their own terms and follow them where they lead us, we
have to go beyond standard ways of looking at the politics, economics, and social
formations of the Middle East. For me, I was interested in rural histories and thinking
about how those histories connect to larger issues in Ottoman imperial history. What
do rural peoples do? Well, they have complicated and variegated lives, interiority,
subjectivity, and so on, just like everyone else. That is obvious. Much of their day-to-
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day labor consists of growing food, tending fields, dealing with their animals, trading,
and ensuring the health of their community. How does this sort of daily drudgery of
rural life connect to the Ottoman Empire? Taxation is one of the ways clearly. And we
have lots of excellent studies of that in Ottoman historiography. For me, I came to see
that a focus on irrigation was another way to link together countryside and imperium.
And it was really this turn to irrigation that pushed me to read work far outside of
Middle Eastern history. Reading this work of course set me off in all sorts of other
directions as well. The point is that if I wanted to understand irrigation and water
systems I had to try to learn about these things in depth. Middle East Studies was not
going to help me in this regard. That’s fine, and reading beyond the field would be a
regular and unsurprising thing to do. Still, I think we often miss opportunities to
connect the wonderful work of our field to other disciplines and historiographies.
For example, one of the things that has always struck me is that we have a lot of really great economic histories of
the Middle East, but this work often — not always, but more often than not — is not engaged with economics in any
kind of real way. Again, there are important exceptions. And no doubt it takes time to learn some math, macro-, and
microeconomics, never mind the effort of trying to figure out ways to connect some of this work to our field. I just co-
taught the article by William Sewell on Marc Bloch and comparative history. In it he talks about testable hypotheses
and makes the point that historians often do not put forth rigorous ways of doing comparative history. We adopt
language in which a comparative element is present, but nothing that could be taken as a testable hypothesis. In
other words, why this outcome from a set of conditions and not another? We come up with a story and go with it,
without considering possible alternative histories and why our explanation is better than the rest. One can take this
sort of thing very far. Of course, we use comparative language all the time and can’t treat every statement as a
testable hypothesis. Still in Ottoman history and in Middle East Studies more generally, we often say things like
— and I’m certainly guilty of it — this merchant’s holdings were more than another’s. Okay, but how much more? Why
is this significant? Is it different from the majority of merchants or what? Did this change over time? What’s the
context for this statement and is it actually significant to the story we’re telling? These sorts of things are difficult to
do, but we need to deal with these questions seriously to understand what it means to say things like “more” or
“significant.” I’m getting a little far afield here. The point is that we obviously have to be rigorous in our work. Rigorous
empiricism — this we’re good at. But also rigorous with our comparisons and in reading other fields to see if or how
they are relevant for us—we’re less good at this. It’s hard! The example of economics and testable hypotheses is
simply one of the ways of possibly doing this kind of comparative interdisciplinary work, which was your question.
Let me bring this down to earth a bit. I just wrote a book called The Animal in
Ottoman Egypt. It’s about the history of human-animal relations in Egypt between the
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries and how this helps us to understand some of the
enormous changes that occurred in the empire over that period. Why animals? Well,
first, they were all over my sources. Everywhere! Second, I had read Richard Bulliet’s
work on animals and saw that there was much of importance one could say about
and from the Middle East through this kind of work. So I had examples and lots of
empirical meat. This was at first simply an observation. But there was so much
empirical material that eventually I understood that this must be of real significance to
the world I was interested in — back to the issue we raised earlier about starting from
the sources. In any case, I began reading everything I could about animals. Animal
studies as a field is a vibrant one. Like any field, it has its specific shape and history,
limits, and possibilities. So my initial questions came from Middle East Studies and
my sources. Reading work in the field of animal studies made me see another set of
questions, made me realize how Middle East Studies was different from most of the
work in animal studies, and how we could make an intervention in this and a few
other related fields. Specifically, the economic component was missing from much of
the literature on the history of animals and human-animal relations. In Ottoman
history, we’re lucky to have a very deep empirical source base. In my case, I was
lucky enough to find registers detailing animal populations village by village in Egypt, price data, work accounts, and
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so forth. So this was one way the Middle East story was different. It allowed for an economic history of animals in
human societies, something, again, a lot of the animal studies literature does not deal with. So for me, given my
specific interests and expertise, this was a way both to contribute empirically to our knowledge of the Ottoman Empire
and to try to make an intervention both in Middle East Studies and fields beyond.
Let me put it another way, if I ask my colleagues in other fields if they can name one book in Middle East Studies, it’s
almost always the same title: Orientalism. For good reason, of course. But we have to say this was not written by
someone in Middle East Studies. So one of our most important books in the field—perhaps the most important—was
not written by someone in the field. This is not it of course. Some know Timothy Mitchell’s work (perhaps it’s a
Columbia thing!) and there are others, but the point stands. We are a big field and this is the situation. One of the
ways we can make the field speak to larger historiographical debates is by engaging literatures like environmental
history, economic history, or empire. Not simply to borrow, but to be critical. By reading other fields we can see the
ways in which we can read our own material anew and read theirs anew as well through the lens of our sources and
the questions of Middle East Studies. I am of course not the only person saying this. The anthropologists are a great
example of reaching beyond Middle East Studies. Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that the Middle East
has been central to the shaping of the discipline of anthropology in unique ways very different from the place of the
Middle East in history or other disciplines. In the end, the payoff for seriously trying to enter other fields is large. It
takes some work, of course, and there are bound to be obstacles along the way, but it’s all worth it.
SK: One thing that comes to my mind is the insularity of Middle East Studies. There is a
certain resistance to theory in our field, thick description in favor of analysis.
AM: I don’t know if I would say there is resistance to theory in the field. We’ve had
various waves of work that engaged different theoretical moments. There was the
gender and sexuality literature of the eighties and nineties. A lot of that was engaged
with questions outside of Middle East Studies and was very theoretical in its own
ways. Postcolonial Studies has, for the most part, missed us (or we’ve missed it!). It’s
always striking to me that Subaltern Studies came out of peasant studies and labor
and working class history in South Asia. We have a strong tradition of labor and
working class history in the Middle East, along with lots of excellent studies of
peasant histories. Yet, we haven’t had anything akin to Subaltern Studies—an
explosion that rocked scholarship in multiple fields. Why is that? It’s worth thinking
about some more. Very practically, I think part of the answer lies in the fact that we
never had the kind of collectivity that existed with Subaltern Studies — a group of
scholars working together around a set of issues and meeting regularly to discuss
them in focused ways. They also had the journal. We never had anything like that.
Maybe MERIP or Talal Asad’s and Roger Owen’s Review of Middle East Studies
from the seventies come closest to that sort of thing, but these are obviously very
different.
It would be interesting to do a comparative study of area studies fields. Some people are doing this. For us in Middle
East Studies, it does seem to me that the straightjacket of “area studies” is tighter than in South Asian Studies. Few
people begin in Middle East Studies and then migrate out. Again, many exceptions—Asad, Mitchell, Saba Mahmood,
come to mind but there are many others too. We have some introspection to do as a field. It’s useful. Obviously, my
generation of scholars couldn’t be doing what we are doing without the work of scholars in previous generations of
Middle East Studies — we’re standing on the shoulders of giants. I think a big difference though is that many of us
are also committed to having an effect on our respective disciplines. And, again, this is largely the outgrowth of
previous scholars banging on the door of the disciplines to let Middle East Studies in. It also has to do in part with the
denouement of area studies. In any case, we’re in the disciplines like never before. Now we need to prove we
belong. So I think some of the work on gender and sexuality, environmental history, secularism, and so on is part of
this effort. The questions are formed around conceptual issues. Being trained in a discipline is important and helps us
to place the Middle East on the larger agendas of various fields. The Middle East has a very important story to tell
about, for example, the environment. Whether it is the kind of work Sam White does in his book The Climate of
Rebellion or Bulliet’s work on animals. Empire is another way this can be done. There are many ways.
SK: Exactly. One of the problems I see with some of the literature in Middle East Studies is
the reduction of Marxist methodology to a checklist, formulas, stages, modes of production.
As Rosa Luxemburg showed, capitalism cannot do without its predecessors. I think your book
is a brilliant exploration of the formal subsumption of capital, the ways in which older and
newer forms become coarticulated. In the book, the word capitalism only appears in two
quotes, and you do not mention Marx. I don’t think this is at all a deficit, but I do wonder
about your take on Marxism and Marxist history. There is of course a huge tradition of
Marxism in Middle Eastern history.
AM: Only two times? And no Marx?! I didn’t know that. To your question—to be reductionist, I would say that I
basically agree with Marx. His thought was part of the basic way I was trained as a historian. Marx was in the water
for me in graduate school at Berkeley. Some of my teachers entered the field at the height of the at least sometimes
Marxist debates around social and cultural history. Marxian ideas of history were so imbedded in my intellectual
formation as to be almost unnamed. History from below, peasant histories, labor, structure/agency: it was all there. I
think my work is clearly inflected with a Marxist sensibility, if even unstated, as you point out. This comes through in
my treatment of animals as capital, my focus on the abstraction of certain forms of labor, and on my treatment of the
state. I don’t consider myself a card carrying Marxist but the ideas are clearly influential in my work, so much so that
they’re perhaps sometimes invisible. I don’t think I’ve read Marx since graduate school. I guess that’s clear from my
bibliography in Nature and Empire, though I do have an epigraph from Marx in my animal book. It goes without
saying that Middle East Studies—and indeed the discipline of history as a whole—has been influenced much for the
better I think by its engagement with Marxist ideas.
SK: Well, as we were talking about before, I think one of the major differences between Middle
East Studies and Subaltern Studies is the latter’s critical engagement with Marxism. Their
work transformed theory.
AM: Yes, exactly. Why the difference? An important difference is that the Subaltern Studies collective was
responding individually and as a group to the inadequacy of scholarship in explaining their experiences. They were
reacting to specific ways in which the history of South Asia was being written from a colonial perspective. Many of
these scholars were grounded in the Indian educational system and often in the political movements of their
universities. They, like all of us, had a tactile feeling for their history and didn’t see this reflected in the Cambridge
School brand of colonial history. So they started working on topics that spoke to them and that were missing—
peasant histories, untouchability, gender, workers, violence. That is how the work began. The theoretical work came
a bit later. It developed out of a concern about how their history was being written. Also, I think their critiques of
empire hit at a moment when the Soviet Union was collapsing. There was a sense that the world of nations built up
out of the old empires was up for grabs and their work, self-consciously and not, tapped into that interest.
The tradition of labor or Marxist history in Middle East Studies has a very different lineage. There were some
scholars in Turkey and some in Egypt who were writing political work and history, all the while engaged in the exigent
political struggles of their day. These Turkish and Egyptian scholars were largely writing in Turkish and Arabic though,
and so couldn’t reach the audience those writing in English could and indeed eventually did. They also didn’t have
something as formidable as the Cambridge School to fight against. In any case, perhaps we’re again in a moment
where this kind of intertwined scholarly and political engagement is reemerging, though it’s not clear to me this has
very much to do with Marxism as such.
SK: One of the problems facing scholars of the Ottoman Empire has been the availability of
sources.
AM: Well, yes and no. Ottoman historians enjoy a surfeit of sources compared to lots of other historiographies, South
Asia included. But, yes, sources can sometimes still be an issue, especially for those working on the twentieth
century. Accessing archival sources about the twentieth-century Middle East is an enormous problem. This is all
about politics of course. Whether it’s the history of Armenians in the early Turkish Republic or any of the Arab wars of
the twentieth century, we don’t have the sources. In Egypt, for example, there are essentially no archival materials












situation with the early modern period and the nineteenth century is very different. And twentieth-century archival
sources are not completely absent of course (interestingly the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf seem to be
untapped frontiers here), but the difficulties are legion.
SK: Nature and Empire was amazingly good at showing how the Ottoman Empire became
enmeshed in the flow of Nile, the minutiae of the Egyptian countryside, in the everyday
relationships of peasant cultivators to their immediate local environments. Would you speak a
little to the problem of state-centrism in Ottoman history? There seems to be a sort of naive
acceptance of archival sources as being only emanations of the state, as unmediated facts of
imperial power. So could we talk about how ecological approaches can reorient the question
of the state?
AM: Yes, there is often a kind a state-centrism in our field. Partly, that has to do with
the fact that until recently, well maybe still, we had very strong states in the Middle
East—whether the Ottoman Empire or Mubarak’s Egypt. That obviously affected and
will continue to affect scholarship on the region. But it’s not so simple of course, and I
am obviously not saying that one can speak about the whole of the Ottoman Empire
from the thirteenth century to the twentieth and Egypt in the ‘80s and ‘90s as
somehow equivalent. For me one of the most interesting and pressing questions—
one we need to continually ask—is what was the Ottoman Empire. What was it in a
given place at a given time? It changed over time and from place to place. The
empire in Egypt in 1587 was neither the empire in Sofia in 1587 nor the empire in
Egypt in 1588. In my work, I often argue that Egypt was the most important region of
the empire. This was for a variety of reasons. It was the most lucrative province of the
empire, had the second largest city, maintained important administrative and
intellectual connections to Istanbul, and was the hinge of the empire in North Africa,
the eastern Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. But even in a place such as Egypt,
like in all imperial provinces, there were places untouched by the empire. What do I
mean by “untouched?” When you read certain chronicles produced in Egypt during
the period of Ottoman rule (I’m thinking here of Shirbini’s famous Hazz al-Quhuf, for example), there is very little—
sometimes no—mention of the empire. No imperial officials, no annual tribute, no Istanbul, no sultan. Where is the
empire? How can we call this place “Ottoman?” What about it, if anything, was “Ottoman?” We might turn to the court
records of a town or region, and there we might find plenty pointing to the presence of the empire. But still, what was
going on with these places that seemed to go in and out of the empire, or that were sometimes Ottoman and
sometimes not? Were they Ottoman? And what might that mean in such cases? There is a great article by Alexander
J. Motyl entitled “Is Everything Empire? Is Empire Everything?” I don’t think everything is empire. The state—back to
your question about state-centrism—is not always there. The Ottoman state and most early modern states were
sometimes there and sometimes not. Part of our job is to figure out these relationships for different places and
peoples in different times. How did certain groups and places negotiate their relationship to the state? How did
particular practices bring people in to or out of the state? Where, how, why, and when did particular imperial
entanglements happen? Figuring out answers to these sorts of questions has obviously been generative of massive
amounts of historiography in Ottoman Studies and other fields.
There was of course an older historiography in the Arab World (and in other former Ottoman territories) that
presented the early modern history of the region as if the Ottoman Empire never existed. Books and books adopted
only that one view from the sources—a society with seemingly no traces of empire. Some of these historians were
nationalists but, importantly, not all of them. At the same time, there is also a strand of Turkish nationalist
historiography in which the Ottoman Empire seemingly never included the Arab world. Magically, the Ottoman Empire
just happened to coincide with the borders of the Turkish Republic. On the other end of the spectrum, we have an
approach to Ottoman history in which the empire seems to be responsible for anything and everything that happened
within its borders. Well, those chroniclers we mentioned—Shirbini and others—don’t seem to bear this out. The point
is that the Ottoman Empire didn’t fit either of these characterizations. As with most things, the truth lies somewhere in
between and was constantly a moving target.
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This brings us then to the utility of the ecological approach. In the introduction to my
animal book I say explicitly that we should think of the Ottoman Empire (and other
empires) as ecosystems. What do I mean? An ecosystems-approach to empire
foregrounds the connectivities of empire. The idea is that even the smallest of
changes in one part of the system can have consequences very far away or for the
system as a whole—consequences even for places and peoples outside of the
system. Ecosystems, like empires, are about figuring out the sets of relationships that
allow the system to function. This approach is not meant to be a totalizing theory but
rather to shift our attention to mutual constitution and maintenance rather than simple
flows of power.. In other words, in thinking about imperial relationships we may trace
those that connect to the state, but we might also find whole sets of relationships that
operate outside of any connection to the capital or imperial officials or the court.
Moving in and out of the state, if you will, helps to illuminate its capacities and limits
and opens up whole other worlds Studying irrigation was for me one of the ways to
do this kind of work. Irrigation is grounded in a specific place, embedded in that
space—a space of infinite difference from all others spaces. No two environments are
the same. You can never step in the same river twice. However you want to say it,
the particulars matter. This is another insight we can borrow from ecology.
Still, what happened with each particular irrigation canal or ditch or embankment had
imperial consequences. If for any reason irrigation in Egypt did not maintain, fields
would become barren, agricultural production would ebb, commercial and imperial shipping networks would suffer,
people could starve. A very small rural place in Egypt could have important consequences for people and places in
North Africa, Anatolia, and beyond. I was interested in how these “minor” rural locales had wide imperial
consequences. I was interested in how they functioned within and as part of the Ottoman state’s bureaucratic
ecosystem. I was interested in what they revealed the early modern imperial state to be. In this way then, I tried to
bob and weave between, borrow and benefit, but not be held back by the two historiographical traditions I outlined
above: the Ottoman Empire did not exist in the Arab World and it was responsible for everything. I also wanted to
present an empirical description of how things operated on the ground in real ways—an understanding of the ecology
of irrigation in Egypt. Mine was a very small contribution, and I’m of course not the only person doing this sort of
thing. We are collectively trying to figure out these connections of empire, trying to wrap our heads around the dizzy
of the history of the Ottoman Empire. And, again, always in my mind is the question, what is empire? What was the
Ottoman Empire in that particular place at that particular time? What was it for peasants tilling their fields in the south
of Egypt? Often the empire was a way for them to fix their embankments. That’s what it was. Empire provided the
resources to fix irrigation infrastructure and was sometimes a venue to make claims that made these repairs happen.
That’s it. That’s what the Ottoman Empire looked like to these imperials subjects. This relationality will obviously look
and be different in different parts of the empire. The exciting thing now in Ottoman Studies is that we have a set of
studies to think about these things in many different ways. It’s a good moment.
SK: Let’s talk about another essential absence in Ottoman historiography and history writing
more generally—animals. Where are they? They are everywhere in the archive as you’ve
mentioned, often more present than humans, but they don’t appear very often in the stories we
tell of the past. We do seem to be witnessing an ‘animal turn’ in the humanities at the
moment. But there are lots of skeptics, both critical and traditional historians, who do not
seem to want to share historical agency with nonhumans. So, what is at stake here? Why this
resistance to the animal?
AM: It is empirically true that animals are everywhere. We have to take this seriously. This seems basic. Also, we
are ourselves animals so in many ways the animal is a more capacious category for doing history than the human.
Moreover, animal history is in many ways quite a natural progression in the history of doing history from below. For
this tradition (as for Subaltern Studies), women, minorities, workers, the poor and peasants – any group that is which
has been cut out of historical scholarship – became the central focus in understanding societies, cultural
constructions, and political formations. We are now turning to the historical importance of the animals we’ve always
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lived with. The added punch here—the “left-handed blow” as Erica Fudge, borrowing from Benjamin, terms the animal
move—is the crossing of the nonhuman divide. Is this really qualitatively different from crossing a class, gender,
linguistic, or temporal divide? Might I not have greater access to the worldview of the dog, hypothetically speaking,
I’ve shared my house with for fifteen years  than I do to a human living in a place I’ve never visited, speaking a
language I barely know? Historians are wedded, consciously or not, to viewing humans as the only actors in history.
That’s fine. We can write and have written and will continue to write histories about just humans.
But there are other agents in history too. Plenty of work in environmental history,
animal studies, geography, and other fields points to the agency of nonhumans—be it
a river, an earthquake, or an animal—to affect the world in which we live and in which
our historical subjects lived. So what is historical agency? Must it involve
intentionality? Does an earthquake have intentionality? Probably not. Did Columbus
mean to kill 90% of the population of the Americas? Probably not. If historical agency
involves both intentionality and having historical effects, then check both boxes for
animals. Animals feel, think, remember. The scientific literature—most of it is about
dogs, elephants, and chimps—is clear about this. Dogs experience emotion, create
social bonds, and act based on premeditation. What is it that makes a human
distinctive then? Is it language? No. Dolphins, dogs, elephants all communicate. The
animal question, even if we don’t have definitive answers, challenges us in various
ways, pushes us in many fruitful directions. These are not new questions. The Greeks, Enlightenment philosophes,
and most serious thinkers in between contemplated the differences between humans and other animals. What was
the nature of the human? What made him and her distinctive?
One can work on animals in many different ways. You can study the economic history of animal labor in very
empirical ways. How many foot-pounds of torque does an Egyptian water buffalo put out? As I mentioned, there is
plenty of theoretical work on the constitution and definition of the human-animal divide. Derrida did a lot in this
direction. There is work on animal emotions, animals and cities, animals in literature, in art, and on and on. Affective
bonds, companionate relations, pet keeping—huge. For many humans in the world today – or in Europe and
America, at least- their most intimate relationships are with nonhumans. Ten minutes walking around New York or
London makes this very clear. Lots of people treat their dogs like children. It’s serious business. And I think we as
scholars should pay attention to just how serious this is.
One last dog example. There are several breeds of domestic dog that cannot exist without humans. Eighty percent of
bulldogs are born through caesarean-section because humans have engineered their heads to be so big they don’t fit
through their mothers’ pelvises. It’s an amazing thing. We humans literally made these dogs possible. They can only
be brought into the world through the mediation of humans. We do not need dogs in any vital political or economic
bare life sense. So who then is the domestic animal here? The bulldogs or the humans? One could argue they have
domesticated us, through their cuteness and affection, to birth them, feed them, and shelter them. They’re getting the
deal!
SK: Your own work on animals in The Animal in Ottoman Egypt is not only about dogs, is it?
AM: No, not at all. Dogs are just one of three classes of animals I focus on in the book—domesticated laboring
animals and charismatic megafauna are the other two. I was initially pulled in by the domestic animals—oxen,
donkeys, cows, camels. They were the most common nonhuman animals in rural Egypt. The very reason I came to
write the book was that I saw lots of these animals in the court records I was reading for my first book. They were
there as rural capital—the ownership of animals was the most important source of peasant wealth in early modern
Ottoman Egypt. Animals did productive labor, moved goods, and provided food and heat. I clued into these animals
and started collecting as many documents and other kinds of sources as I could find.
There is a lot on dogs. Ottoman authorities supported dog populations in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Cairo
and other cities. They put out food for them, provided them with water, and punished people who harmed them.
Why? Dogs consumed garbage and hence were important for keeping cities clean. They also herded, hunted, and
provided security. As I show, however, at the end of eighteenth century, ideas about hygiene, urban planning, and
disease changed. Both garbage and dogs became a problem in Cairo. I trace this out to efforts that aimed eventually
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to remove dogs from cities. The early nineteenth century witnessed several large-scale dog eradication campaigns in
Cairo and Alexandria (and, again, in other Ottoman cities as well). These changing ideas and practices of course
transformed the relationships between humans and dogs in the nineteenth century.
The last class of animals in the book are charismatic megafauna, “exotic” animals if you prefer. In this section, I show
how older Indian Ocean networks that moved these animals between the Middle East and South Asia were
transformed in the nineteenth century by the advent of new animal institutions such as zoos and schools of veterinary
medicine. I also discuss the burgeoning global trade that served to funnel these animals to zoos in the nineteenth
century.
In terms of what the book is trying to do, like Nature and Empire, it aims to understand the transition from the early
modern to something else, call it modernity if you like, in the nineteenth century. And along the way, it is of course
trying to center the human-animal relationship as a motor of the history of the Ottoman Empire and early modern
world more generally.
SK: Interesting.
AM: Thank you. I wanted, if you’ll allow me, to return for a moment to thinking about some of the resistance to animal
studies and Middle East environmental history that you asked about before. I’d point out at the start that we need to
acknowledge that many scholars in the fields of Ottoman history and Middle East Studies have been very receptive to
this kind of work. This is of course very nice for those of us working on these topics. Infinitely more importantly, it’s
indeed very exciting and inspiring to see the sizeable number of graduate students and more established scholars
turning to environmental questions. Nevertheless, I still think you’re right to identify a degree of reticence, even
suspicion, on the part of some when it comes to environmental history. I can point to two completely understandable
reasons for this. The first is the afterlife of a racialist or colonial ethnographic literature that used environmental
factors to “explain” things such as a purported “oriental lethargy” or “eastern sexuality” or the like. Colonial officials
saying that the east was backwards because it was hot,  that because Islam was a “desert religion” it developed
certain familial politics or ideas about the afterlife, that certain kinds of politics only existed in the tropics, or that
oriental despotism was a function of irrigation in China, Iraq, and Egypt. These racialized notions were often invoked,
along with many other nonsensical ideas, in the service of projects of European political and economic domination.
Such nefarious ideas still operate in both overt and unconscious ways so it’s important for us to be aware of their
power and to defend against them. I think for some then the kneejerk reaction is to reject out of hand ideas that try to
connect nature to history, people to ecology. There are crude ways of doing environmental history as there are crude
ways of doing most kinds of history. But there are also sensible and productive ways of thinking about the
relationships between humans and the rest of nature.
The second reason many are skeptical of environmental history has to do with the
way the modernization paradigm became programitized in the Middle East in the
twentieth century. One of the effects of seeking out a western bourgeois remodeling
of Arab or Turkish or Persian society was to push peasants, never mind animals, out
of the way. Lazy peasants (sound familiar?) held us back, the vagaries of the Nile
were a problem for development, and so forth. The very word peasant became an
insult. Nationalist discourses – not just in the Middle East – usually focused on cities,
technology, and factories putting distance between the rural peasant and the nation.
To bring the peasant back in, or the animal in at all, flies in the face of these
modernizing paradigms that have dominated the Middle East and the field of Middle
East Studies for quite some time. The challenge then I and others have tried to take
on is to explain the potential benefits of environmental history both for furthering the
work of the field and for pushing it in different directions.
SK: Related to this, what impressed me the most about your work
was the profound sense of contingency throughout. Often with
conceptual histories we are bound by the purview of the concept. It becomes a form of
determinism in its own way, a yardstick that prevents the full flux of the past to be captured
in all its complexity and messiness. Scholars often ask questions in ways that predetermine
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their findings. They don’t, in other words, let what they find lead them. But rather than just
summarizing imperial decrees, you seem to be more interested in looking at specific forms of
infrastructure and particular sites. In thinking about a research project, how does contingency
work for you and how did it work for the empire?
AM: I went to the archives with the idea that irrigation would help me think about the
connections between the local and the imperial, along the lines we talked about
before. I went to the archives hoping to find some stuff about irrigation. That vague
topic and a desire to work with both local court records in Egypt and imperial
documents in Istanbul—that’s what I had when I went to the field. I was lucky enough
to find material—lots of material. Stories about breaking dams, peasants taking more
water from canals than they were entitled to, work orders, court cases about
dredging, and on and on. There was certainly a great deal of contingency in that I
could have found nothing. There was also contingency in that a lot of what I did find
set me off in new directions. For example, I found all these linkages between water
and wood. It’s so obvious to me now, and probably should have been obvious to me
then, but I had never thought about the importance of wood to irrigation projects. It
had to be collected from different parts of the empire—southwestern Anatolia and
Syria mostly—and then be moved to forestless Egypt. An enormous affair—one full of
contingencies, risks, and problems. I could give other examples too. Anyone who has
worked in archives knows all the excitement involved, the surprises, the frustrations,
and the joys. Ultimately we can only tell the stories we find. This, I suppose, is the
ultimate meaning of doing history. It’s a certain way of relating to our materials, to the
archive. We have to be open to possibilities, to changing our mind, to wandering
around in the sources, to getting lost, and to being wrong. We have to approach the
archive with an open mind. That requires humility. It also requires time. The more time in the archives, the better.
Some may disagree. I’ve heard it said that there are often diminishing returns the longer one spends in the archives,
but I’ve never found that to be the case. The archives are always so generative of ideas for me. But, again, time: the
older one gets and the more responsibilities one has, the harder it can be to spend the years needed sitting in an
uncomfortable chair. But that’s what we do.
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